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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

1 SEPT 1971

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

1 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 35)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 23 - 29 AUGUST 1971

Moscow (2828 items)

China	(6%)	8%
U.S. Economic Measures	(9%)	7%
Indochina	(8%)	5%
Romanian Liberation Anniversary	(2%)	5%
CEMA Council Session	(4%)	3%
Middle East	(2%)	3%
Mali President in USSR	(--)	3%
George Jackson Death	(--)	2%

Peking (1363 items)

Domestic Issues	(21%)	33%
Indochina	(16%)	20%
[Cambodia	(9%)	13%]
[Ieng Sary, Special Envoy, RGNUC/FUNK, in PRC	(2%)	7%]
PRC UN Seat	(8%)	11%
PRC Military Delegation in East Europe	(10%)	10%
Romanian Liberation Anniversary	(2%)	10%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi's polemic against the Chinese has subsided since the vitriolic 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article made clear that Hanoi feels the Chinese are allowing their nationalism to lead them to policies which undermine the unity of socialist countries. But there are some elements in Premier Pham Van Dong's 31 August National Day speech which seem to reflect disquiet. Whereas last year he said the Vietnamese would always be grateful for the "tremendous" aid from the USSR, PRC, and other socialist countries, this time he avoided such a direct expression of appreciation. Lauding the correctness of the DRV line in holding the initiative diplomatically as well as militarily this year, he said: "Thanks to this, we have won the sympathy, support, and assistance--which are in fact the expression of the militant solidarity--of the USSR, China, and the other socialist countries and world peoples This militant solidarity has led to the formation of the world people's front" He then said pointedly "our thanks go to Marx and Lenin, to President Ho Chi Minh, who have instilled in our people the purest and noblest sentiments of proletarian internationalism Our thanks go to our brothers and friends in all continents for material strength and moral encouragement."

Dong delivered a sharp jibe at President Nixon when he said that "Richard Nixon has continued and stepped up the aggressive war" rather than following the trend set by the communist "initiatives" in 1968 for a political settlement. He added: "It is clear that "Nixon does not want to talk seriously" to settle the Vietnam question on the basis of the PRG seven-point proposal of 1 July.

Both Moscow and Peking marked the DRV anniversary in standard fashion, with meetings and messages from the top leaders. Soviet media have continued to report Hanoi's polemical propaganda, including the 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article: Both PRAVDA on the 25th and Moscow radio in Mandarin on the 25th and 26th carried reports including the reference to the Chinese as "opportunist." Other Moscow propaganda continues to charge that the President's planned trip to Peking enables him to avoid a reply to the PRG's 1 July proposal. Against this background, Moscow and Hanoi announced that Podgornyy will visit the DRV in October.

SHRILLNESS OF HANOI'S POLEMIC AGAINST PEKING SUBSIDES

There has been no repetition in Hanoi propaganda of the blatant allusion to the Chinese as "opportunist" in their dealings

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with the United States which appeared in the 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article, "Nixon--The Man and His Doctrine." Other propaganda continues to press such themes as DRV self-reliance and correct assessment of the United States as the main enemy, though in less sharply polemical fashion than earlier comment reacting to Sino-U.S. developments. The 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article is not yet available from the press, and the only known Hanoi radio version of it is the two-installment summary broadcast in Mandarin on the 25th and 26th. That version deletes the venomously anti-Chinese passage which, as reported by VNA, said:

A very perfidious move of the President's is to spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads in a bid to play off socialist countries against one another and sow schism among the communist and workers' parties.

The radio version does include verbatim the sentence that preceded this passage in the VNA version--"Nixon is resorting to all sorts of methods to split the revolutionary forces while at the same time vigorously seeking to join with all counterrevolutionary forces."

An editorial pegged to the anniversary of the August Revolution in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 29th, is similar to other recent comment in its stress on such sensitive themes as the DRV's recognition of the United States as the main enemy and on DRV self-reliance. But it is at sharp variance with Hanoi's polemical propaganda against China when it fails to charge that a primary aim of the Nixon Doctrine is to divide the revolutionary forces and the communist countries. It simply says the United States is "now endeavoring to implement the Nixon Doctrine," of which Vietnamization is "the main and initial step." It adds that the United States "cannot avoid criticism from all directions by the revolutionary people throughout the world, and in particular the heavy punitive blows of the three Indochinese peoples"

Although the editorial fails to charge explicitly that U.S. policy is to split the communist countries, a passage on aid to the DRV seems to convey the point by implication. Explaining that DRV policy is carefully balanced between self-reliance and dependence on international assistance, the editorial--without mentioning either the Soviet Union or China--lauds the "unselfish and precious aid from the fraternal countries" which, it says, is given in a spirit of "proletarian internationalism." It concludes that "no matter what expedients the U.S. imperialists resort to, they certainly cannot sabotage the unity with, and support and aid from, the fraternal socialist countries and the progressive people throughout the world for the just fight of our people on the anti-U.S. frontline."

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MOSCOW SAYS PODGORNYY OCTOBER DRV VISIT WILL STRENGTHEN TIES

The announcement that the delegation led by Podgornyy will visit the DRV in October comes some four months after Moscow and Hanoi reported that VWP First Secretary Le Duan, who had gone to the USSR for the 24th CPSU Congress, had issued an invitation to a Soviet party-government delegation when he met with Brezhnev on 14 April. Podgornyy's will be the first visit of a top Soviet leader to the DRV since Kosygin went to Hanoi for Ho Chi Minh's funeral in September 1969.

Moscow has followed the announcement of the visit with a radio commentary on the 30th by Soltan, widely broadcast in foreign languages including Vietnamese and Mandarin, which says:

This visit will undoubtedly serve the cause of further strengthening the fraternal relations between the Soviet and Vietnamese people. Consistency, firm principles, and revolutionary internationalism are typical features of the Soviet Union's policy in respect to the DRV.

The commentary observes that the Vietnamese have had "many occasions" in "their rugged, heroic struggle for freedom" to become convinced of the efficiency of Soviet support. Taking an unusual tack, Soltan asserts that in 1954 the USSR "took the initiative" in convening the Geneva conference which led to the restoration of peace. Some of the versions of the commentary, including the one in Mandarin, add that Ho Chi Minh "highly estimated" the Soviet Union's role which helped the Vietnamese people to establish peace. This crediting of Soviet "initiative" is at variance with the line voiced periodically in recent years in Moscow's comment appealing to Peking for communist unity in support of Vietnam. That comment has recalled Sino-Soviet cooperation at the 1954 Geneva conference as an example of how united action by the socialist countries can frustrate U.S. "aggression."

SOVIET AID The Soltan commentary's reference to the Soviet role in 1954 appears to be Moscow's way of further reinforcing its documentation of support for the Vietnamese. The commentary also contains an unusually detailed discussion of Soviet aid. For example, it recalls that the USSR built about 150 industrial and other projects in the DRV and that more than 2,500 Soviet specialists have worked in North Vietnam. It also points to the Soviet provision of

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antiaircraft installations, rockets, and fighter planes which helped finally to stop the U.S. air war. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on 22 August had gone into somewhat similar detail in the course of an attack on Peking's splittist policies.

A Moscow commentary on Podgorny's visit broadcast in Mandarin on the 31st similarly describes Soviet aid in some detail and again reiterates charges that Peking obstructed the transit of this aid. It recalls specifically that the Red Guards stirred up "provocations" against Soviet experts who were on their way to the DRV.

SINO-U.S. Other routine Moscow comment continues to charge
RELATIONS that President Nixon's planned trip to Peking enables him to avoid a reply to the PRG's seven-point peace proposal. A panelist in the 29 August domestic service roundtable discussion said American press commentators connect the Nixon trip with the "stalemate" in Paris and speculated that the President hopes "to obtain certain advantages in South Vietnamese affairs from this visit." The panelist remarked that James Reston's Hong Kong interview on his visit to the PRC, published in the New York TIMES on 27 August, supports this reasoning; he cited Reston as reporting that the Chinese leaders told him that although they want the United States to withdraw its troops from the Far East, they do not want it done immediately. The Moscow panelist did not acknowledge that Reston said the Chinese attitude stemmed from fear of Japan.

USSR MARKS DRV ANNIVERSARY WITH LEADERS' MESSAGE, MEETING

Moscow has observed the DRV's national day with the usual greetings message from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, a public meeting in Moscow on 31 August, and publicity for a reception held by the DRV ambassador. Vice Premier Novikov was the speaker at the meeting; the lower-ranking chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities had addressed the 25th anniversary meeting last year. Politburo member Mazurov and Party Secretary Katushev, present at that meeting, also attended this one. In previous nondecennial years the meeting had been attended variously by Politburo members or candidate members and addressed by a Moscow city official.

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The Soviet leaders' message, available thus far only in a 1 September TASS summary, reiterates Soviet determination to continue giving "all-round assistance" to the patriotic forces of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Expressing the Soviet Union's resolve to "strengthen in every way" its "friendship and all-round cooperation" with the VWP and Vietnamese people, it says the achievement of these goals will be served by the forthcoming visit of a Soviet party-government delegation to the DRV. The message expresses confidence that the Vietnamese people, "following the immortal behests of Ho Chi Minh," will make the aggressors get out of Vietnam; it also reiterates Moscow's support for the PRG's seven-point proposal.

Novikov's speech at the Moscow meeting, as reported briefly in a Moscow broadcast in English, reviewed Soviet aid to Vietnam in some detail and promised continued aid and political support to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples. The broadcast quoted the DRV charge d'affaires, speaking at the same meeting, as praising Soviet aid and as noting that Podgorny's forthcoming visit will "undoubtedly foster greater friendship and solidarity between the parties of the two countries and their peoples."

A report of the Moscow meeting transmitted from VNA's Moscow office to Hanoi, not yet publicly disseminated, omits Novikov's detailing of Soviet aid. It stresses instead that he praised the military successes of the "united anti-imperialist front of the Indochinese peoples" and the "correct path" followed by the Vietnamese people in socialist construction at home under the leadership of the "Marxist-Leninist VWP" and "faithful to the will of President Ho Chi Minh." It also stresses Novikov's expression of support for the PRG's seven-point program. The report's brief summary of the DRV charge d'affaires' remarks omits his reference to Podgorny's forthcoming visit.

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PEKING CELEBRATES DRV ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION

Peking's treatment of the 26th anniversary of the founding of the DRV is comparable thus far to its observance of the 24th anniversary in 1969; last year's 25th anniversary was marked with special celebrations highlighted by a Peking rally on 2 September. The current anniversary has been marked by the customary Mao-Lin-Chou message to the top DRV party and state leaders, a Peking reception sponsored by friendship organizations, and an NCNA article by two PLA members. Observance of the 1969 anniversary included a DRV embassy reception in Peking on 2 September attended by a top-level Chinese delegation headed by Chou, an event which presumably will recur this year.

The Mao-Lin-Chou message to the DRV leaders, carried by NCNA on 1 September, is shorter than the messages of the previous two years and differs from them in some other respects. Thus the message characterizes the situation in Indochina as "unprecedentedly fine"--a characterization which has marked Peking's assessment since the Lam Son 719 operation--in contrast to last year's description of an "excellent" situation and to the absence of any assessment in the 1969 message. A reference in 1969 to the North Vietnamese people's perseverance "in a spirit of self-reliance," omitted in 1970, reappears in this year's message. The 1970 message contained a passage--absent from the current message--on the three Indochinese peoples "supporting and assisting each other and persevering in protracted people's war."

Terming Sino-Vietnamese friendship "unbreakable," the current message repeats similar pledges in previous messages that the Chinese will "resolutely fulfill their internationalist obligations and give all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese and the other Indochinese peoples against the United States "until complete victory." In one notable omission, the charge contained in previous messages that the United States pursues "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" is not repeated this year. The 1970 message warned against U.S. "schemes and machinations" while expressing confidence that the Indochinese peoples could not be "cowed or duped"--language that might be deemed inappropriate now in the light of recent Sino-U.S. developments. However, the article by the two PLA men carried by NCNA on 31 August accused "U.S. imperialism" of "playing more vigorously with its counter-revolutionary dual tactics" and of failing to make "any positive response" to the PRG's 1 July proposals.

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At the friendship organizations' reception on 31 August, Kuo Mo-jo toasted Vietnamese victories against "U.S. aggression" and predicted "complete victory over the U.S. aggressors and their running dogs." NCNA's brief account of his remarks contained no mention of President Nixon. The DRV ambassador, however, was quoted by NCNA as having "strongly denounced the Nixon clique" for intensifying the war and committing "heinous crimes" in Indochina.

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ASIAN UNITY STRESSED ON CAMBODIAN "ENVOY'S" ARRIVAL IN PRC

Following Prince Sihanouk's mission to North Korea during which he helped secure Pyongyang's endorsement of Peking's invitation to President Nixon, the arrival in Peking of a "special envoy of the interior part" of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and government (RGNU) has occasioned renewed emphasis on themes of Asian unity and solidarity among Peking and its allies. The arrival of the envoy, Ieng Sary, was announced in a RGNU "communique" carried by NCNA on 20 August which did not, however, specify the date he arrived. It said that he was welcomed by RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chiu Hui-tso. The image of Asian unity was served by the presence of DRV, PRG, Laotian, and North Korean representatives as well as Chinese and Cambodian officials at banquets for the envoy on 25 and 27 August.

CAMBODIAN SITUATION According to the communique, Ieng Sary delivered to Sihanouk messages from those carrying on the struggle inside Cambodia under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, RGNU vice premier, defense minister, and commander of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces. The visit of the envoy "directly from the frontlines" in Cambodia has been used as a demonstration of the unity of Khmer patriots at home and abroad and to buttress Sihanouk's claims as leader of an ongoing resistance movement in the homeland despite his exile status. Thus, the RGNU communique stresses that the members of Sihanouk's front inside and outside Cambodia "are closely united in a single bloc" and that they hold "completely identical views" on waging the national liberation war. An AKI commentary on 23 August said the envoy's visit has "great political significance" and "shatters the despicable slander and grotesque information of the enemy aimed at weakening the FUNK and breaking it up by political and diplomatic maneuvers." The commentary claimed that the visit takes place at a time when the resistance movement is "advancing by leaps and bounds in all domains, when we are in a position of initiative and offensive."

The themes of unity and growing military success marked Cambodian speeches at a 25 August banquet for the envoy hosted by Sihanouk and Penn Nouth and at a 27 August banquet given by Chou En-lai. On the 25th Ieng Sary claimed that eight-tenths of the territory and "nearly 5 million" inhabitants have been liberated. This increases the former claim of seven-tenths of the territory and

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four million people, repeated by Sihanouk at a 6 August rally in Pyongyang and even in the 23 August AKI commentary on Ieng Sary's arrival.

In his speech on the 25th Sihanouk was notably defensive in disputing contentions by "certain foreigners" to the effect that "the Khmer resistance at home and abroad are two different movements" and that the RGNU and FUNK abroad are merely an uprooted exile group without political or administrative ties to the homeland. Moreover, noting that "certain international circles" seek "to separate the Khmer communists from the other noncommunist resisters," Sihanouk declared that his "nationalist, progressive, and Marxist compatriots who are carrying on resistance have decided to reject all ideological distinction or differences between them. They are and will be none other than members of the FUNK."

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Sihanouk took the occasion to repeat his rejection of an international conference on Cambodia and to express satisfaction over Peking's support for his position. On the 25th he again ruled out an international conference or a cease-fire in place, and he rejected "a partition of Cambodia or a political compromise under the deceitful signboard of 'national reconciliation' or 'national coalition' with the traitors of Phnom Penh."

At the banquet on the 27th Sihanouk noted that the Khmer patriots in the "interior" were "extremely satisfied and overjoyed" over the publication of the 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, which, he said, supported Cambodia's position as expressed in his 24th message to the Khmer nation. He quoted from the Commentator article's denunciation of the idea of a new Geneva conference and its demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina.*

None of the speeches mentioned President Nixon's projected visit--presumably in deference to Peking, which has not referred directly to the visit in its own name since the original announcement--but Sihanouk on the 27th said bluntly that all the responsibility for the war in Cambodia "must absolutely rest with U.S. President Richard Nixon and U.S. imperialism, without whom the so-called 'Cambodian problem' and the so-called 'Khmer republic' would not exist." At the same banquet Ieng Sary may have been alluding to

* The Commentator article is discussed in the 4 August TRENDS, pages 5-8.

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the visit when he declared that the Cambodians and Chinese have "the same objective . . . to struggle with determination, without compromise and retreat, without bartering away principles and side by side with the fraternal Vietnamese, Laotian, and Korean peoples" until the United States has been driven out of Asia.

In his speech on the 27th Chou En-lai pointedly interjected a reference to the Nixon Doctrine--the target of Hanoi's polemics attacking Peking's invitation to the President--in saying that "U.S. imperialism is still doing its utmost to push the so-called 'Nixon Doctrine' and its plan of 'Vietnamization' in a wild attempt to hang on in Indochina." Chou described the Indochina situation as "unprecedentedly fine" and said victories of "strategic significance" had been won on "the various battle-fronts of Indochina" this year. He went on to promise continued "firm support" to the three Indochinese peoples.

Hanoi's VNA on the 27th summarized the speeches by Sihanouk and Ieng Sary at the 25 August banquet and briefly noted that Chou En-lai promised continued "powerful backing to the three peoples of Indochina" and "firm support" to them in carrying through to the end their war against U.S. aggression. On 30 August VNA summarized Chou's speech of the 27th, noting that he promised the Indochinese countries "resolute support" and praised their military victories as having "strategic significance," but Hanoi has not been heard to mention the Cambodians' speeches on that occasion.

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PRC SUPPORTS NLHS DETERMINATION TO COUNTER "U.S. AGGRESSION"

In Peking's continuing effort to reassure its Indochinese allies of its support, PEOPLE'S DAILY on 31 August offered editorial approval of recent official Pathet Lao statements denouncing the United States for using Lao "rightist" and Thai troops to attack the liberated zone. The editorial endorses a message from Souphanouvong on 25 August and what it calls an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement of the 26th. There is no other reference to such a document and by its description of the content Peking appears to be referring to an NLHS Central Committee "memorandum" dated 25 August. This "memorandum" was summarized by NCNA on the 30th, but was not monitored from Pathet Lao sources until 1 September, when it was broadcast textually.

Peking does not normally support NLHS Central Committee statements with authoritative comment of its own; the last PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on Laos was on 14 February 1971, pegged to the U.S.-supported Laos incursion, Lam Son 719. The editorial had been preceded by an 8 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement pegged to an NLHS Central Committee statement, and a 12 February PRC Government statement which supported the joint statements Sihanouk made with the DRV president and Souphanouvong at the time of his visit to Hanoi.

Peking appears to be seizing on the NLHS "memorandum" as well as Souphanouvong's message to reinforce its assurances of support for its Indochinese allies in the wake of its invitation to President Nixon to visit the PRC. Quoting Souphanouvong's warning that the United States and its lackeys will receive "well-deserved counterblows," the editorial says that the Chinese Government and people express the "firmest support" for the NLHS' "just stand." Documenting U.S. determination to continue "aggression" in Laos, the editorial cites a 9 August U.S. Government statement--presumably a State Department press release that day--which, it says, accused the DRV of carrying out a "massive invasion" of Laos and asserted that the United States is thus "entitled to withhold complete compliance" with the Geneva agreements on Laos. The editorial praises the "excellent revolutionary situation" created by the Lao patriots, as well as the NLHS' efforts for a peaceful settlement including the 6 March 1970 five points and the 22 June proposal.

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The editorial echoes Peking's statements on Lam Son 719 last February when it says that "Laos is a close neighbor of China" and that the Chinese will "do everything in their power" to support the Lao and other Indochinese people. This sentiment had also been expressed in a 26 March 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement supporting an NLHS protest against intensified bombing of Laos and the introduction of Thai troops. But that statement went on to warn more strongly that the Chinese people "will not sit idly by" while U.S. imperialism "acts wantonly" in Laos, a formulation that has not been repeated since.

NLHS MEMORANDUM The NLHS Central Committee memorandum of 25 August, as broadcast by Pathet Lao radio on 1 September, denounced Thailand at length for its cooperation in U.S. "aggression"* and pointed to "the increasingly tense and grave situation in Laos" resulting from U.S. instigation of Thai "regular forces" to coordinate with Vang Pao and Vientiane "rightist" troops in attacking the whole country. It appealed to all peace-loving governments to take "effective measures" to compel the United States and Thailand to "stop aggression" and "sincerely" respond to the NLHS' 22 June proposal on a cease-fire.**

* The DRV and PRG had denounced the increased use of Thai troops in Laos in foreign ministry statements released on 16 and 19 August respectively, preceding the NLHS statement.

** Neither PEOPLE'S DAILY nor the memorandum refers to current military operations in the Plain of Jars, but an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement--carried by the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF) Radio and the Pathet Lao news agency on 28 and 31 August respectively--does denounce the new military operations in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang area and the Bolovens Plateau. This statement, which the PNF radio says was dated the 27th, is available only in summary form thus far.

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SOUPHANOUVONG
MESSAGE

The Souphanouvong message referred to by PEOPLE'S DAILY is another in the prince's continuing series of contacts with Souvanna Phouma on the issue of a cease-fire in Laos. He again criticizes Souvanna Phouma for having refused to respond to the 22 June NLHS proposal for a cease-fire in all Lao territory, and for having suggested instead in his most recent letter a bombing halt only in "northeast Laos, for example the Plain of Jars."*

Souphanouvong points to the "seriousness" of the fact that while Souvanna Phouma rejects the proposal, the "U.S. imperialists" and their "henchmen" are mustering troops, including Thai battalions, to step up military operations in northern and southern Laos. He concludes by warning the "Nixon Administration and his henchmen" that if they refuse to renounce the military ventures they will receive "well-deserved counterblows."

* See the 11 August TRENDS, pages 7-8, for a discussion of the most recent previous exchange between the princes.

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PARIS TALKS: DRV, PRG PRESS PEACE PLAN, ASSAIL GVN ELECTIONS

Vietnamese communist media continue to give low-key attention to the PRG's seven-point peace proposal of 1 July, which called for a total U.S. troop withdrawal in 1971 and the formation of a government of "national concord" in South Vietnam. Beyond the pro forma account of the 26 August Paris session, publicity is confined to scattered items on foreign support for the PRG proposal and demands for U.S. withdrawal. Propaganda claiming support in the United States includes a 26 August VNA report that DRV Premier Pham Van Dong recently received two antiwar delegations from the United States, representing the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and the National Peace Action Coalition. According to VNA, the delegations "welcomed" the seven-point initiative and promised to continue their antiwar activities. And Dong is reported to have "highly praised" the groups' antiwar activities.

At the Paris session on the 26th, both Vietnamese communist delegates again insisted that Vietnamization will not end the war and urged the United States to give a serious response to the seven-point plan. PRG deputy head Dinh Ba Thi--substituting for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh for the second consecutive week--is said to have "laid bare the election farce in Saigon and pointed to the South Vietnamese people's growing opposition to this fraud." The account also notes that Thi said President Thieu had come to power by "fraudulent elections in 1967" and that he warned the United States that another election "fraud" to keep Thieu in power would only worsen its "quandary." The DRV's Xuan Thuy, ridiculing President Nixon's stated desire for self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, said U.S. masterminding of the election "farce" has now been exposed before American and world opinion and stands as "undeniable" proof of U.S. encroachment in South Vietnam. The DRV delegate did not allude to Duong Van Minh's withdrawal from the presidential race on the 20th and Nguyen Cao Ky's withdrawal on the 23d; and VNA does not report the PRG delegate's remark that the "other candidates"--unnamed--had reached the conclusion that the election "is nothing but a 'farce' and a 'trap' and that they must withdraw."

In his statement Thuy took exception to remarks made by the President--in his 15 August announcement on economic measures--that the United States has succeeded in winding down the war and that this is an appropriate time to focus attention on the

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challenge of peace. VNA says Thuy charged that the President sought to "fool" the American public by such allegations and "showed with concrete facts" that the Administration has continued to intensify the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and to encroach on the sovereignty and security of the DRV.

VNA again dismisses the statements of the U.S. and GVN representatives in a single sentence. The account says they "made awkward attempts to deal with the world people's opposition to the U.S. Administration's refusal to give a positive response to the PRG's seven-point peace proposal and the U.S. scheme to maintain Nguyen Van Thieu in power through election frauds." Thus, VNA does not acknowledge that Ambassadors Habib and Lam characterized the communists' approach toward negotiations as negative, that they again urged a cease-fire in place, and that they condemned the recent "indiscriminate" rocketing of Da Nang, which Habib observed was contrary to the 1968 understandings. Both communist delegates in impromptu remarks took exception to the allies' charges: According to the DRV press spokesman, Thuy declared that no tacit agreement was concluded in 1968, and the PRG press spokesman said Thi "rejected the unreasonable and slanderous accusations of the U.S. and Saigon delegates against the patriotic activities of the PLAF in South Vietnam." But these remarks, reported in the VNA service channel from Paris to Hanoi, as usual have not been publicized in Vietnamese communist propaganda media.

The VNA account of the session notes that the next session will be held on 9 September without mentioning that the session on the 2d was cancelled because of DRV National Day. The media continue to ignore the appointment of Ambassador William J. Porter as head of the U.S. delegation. Thus, there was no acknowledgment of Porter's meeting with President Nixon in San Clemente on the 24th, during which the President reportedly reaffirmed the "high priority" he places on a negotiated settlement and said he was sending Porter to Paris "with the widest flexibility" to discuss any questions with the communist side.

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HANOI SPOKESMAN AGAIN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, DRV

The latest in the series of DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements, issued on 1 September, again protests U.S. air and artillery strikes in the northern half of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province. A spokesman's statement issued on 29 August protested action in the same locations but failed to specify that some of the targets were in the DMZ. Hanoi stepped up its protests in the past month, with five DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements--on 7, 10, 16, 23 and 29 August. There had been two such protest statements in June and three in July. With the exception of the 10 August protest, all these statements in the past three months claimed some U.S. action in the northern part of the DMZ.* Only the 19 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest is known to have mentioned the continued U.S. bombing of the southern part of the DMZ.

The 1 September statement charged that from 28 to 31 August the United States bombed Huong Lap village and "from south of the DMZ" shelled Vinh Son, Vinh Quang, and Vinh Giang villages, which it described as being located "in the DMZ, on DRV territory." Oddly, the 29 August statement--which charged that from 24 to 27 August U.S. aircraft attacked Huong Lap village, and shelled "from south of the DMZ and off the coast" Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages--did not point out that the villages are located in the DMZ saying only that they are in "DRV territory." Both protests also charged that U.S. aircraft bombed Quang Binh Province. The one on the 1st said that on 31 August U.S. planes "attacked a number of locations" in Quang Binh, while the statement of the 29th said that U.S. aircraft "many times" conducted "barbarous raids on many areas of Quang Binh Province" from the 24th to 27th.

Like the three most recent protests in August, the one on the 29th claimed losses in lives and property. There was no reference to such losses in the 1 September protest or in those issued during June and July, but three out of four protests in May claimed human and materiel losses.

* The U.S. Command in Saigon on the 28th acknowledged the destruction of a North Vietnamese gun position that day, saying it was the first strike in the northern half of the DMZ since 30 June.

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CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PEKING DEFENDS MOVE TO KEEP INITIATIVE IN CHANGING SITUATION

NCNA has disseminated further material from this year's ninth issue of RED FLAG, the first issue prepared after the announcement of the invitation to President Nixon, as part of an intensified effort to prepare the ideological ground for the President's visit and to justify the PRC's dramatic shifts in line before the international communist movement. On 17 August the Peking domestic radio and PEOPLE'S DAILY had carried an article from issue No. 9 calling for study of Mao's 1940 work "On Policy" as guidance for achieving flexibility in the present international situation.* On the 30th NCNA's international service transmitted another article from that issue, keyed to Mao's 1938 "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," which explains the need to keep the initiative and "remain sober-headed no matter how the situation changes or how complex the struggle becomes." The next day, the NCNA international service carried excerpts of the article that had been publicized in domestic media on the 17th.

Like the RED FLAG article calling for study of Mao's 1940 work, the one based on his 1938 work is presented as a guide for tactical adjustments in a complex situation. As in the former article on tactical flexibility, the latter one on holding the initiative prescribes the use of "dual tactics" and the exploitation of "contentions, breaches, and contradictions" in the enemy camp in order to concentrate on "the most diehard enemies." But where the former article develops this line in the triangular context, providing a rationale for negotiating with the United States in an effort to isolate the Soviet Union as the principal enemy, the article on initiative takes another tack, in effect seeking to justify Peking's line to the international communist movement.

Thus, the article says that in the present international communist movement Mao has led China in "uniting firmly" with genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and other revolutionary forces,

* Discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 19-22. Issue No 9 of the journal also includes the 1 August joint editorial on Army Day, Peking's first comprehensive policy statement since the announcement. The editorial, which propounded "Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line," is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 August, pages 18-22.

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"gaining the initiative and dealing powerful blows at U.S. imperialism and its running dogs. At the same time," it adds, "penetrating criticism of modern revisionism has been made, enabling the people throughout the world to see ever more clearly the aggressive and expansionist nature of Soviet revisionist social imperialism." With such a bitter characterization of the Soviets, the Chinese have made clear to the likes of Hanoi that their antipathy toward Moscow is a basic fact of international life to which Peking's policy will be geared, even if it entails a flexibility toward the United States which Hanoi deplores. In pursuing this policy, the RED FLAG article claims, the CCP "has carried out its proletarian internationalist duty."

The article concludes with a defense of flexibility in changing conditions, an approach Hanoi has castigated as "opportunism." Describing flexibility as the concrete expression of seizing the initiative, the article calls for planning to be combined with flexibility and for the revision of original plans "in accordance with the development of the situation."

PERIOD OF "UPHEAVAL" Against the background of Hanoi's bitter polemics decrying Peking's overtures toward the United States, the Chinese have been making special efforts to justify their moves to their Asian allies. PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, speaking at a banquet for a visiting North Korean military delegation on 18 August, explained that the present world situation is one of "great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization." Echoing this line, Chou En-lai told Peking's Cambodian allies at a banquet on the 27th that "the whole world is in the midst of a great upheaval," adding that the U.S. hegemony established after World War II "has been shaken to its very foundation."

The formulation used by Huang and echoed by Chou revives a key ideological cue that was prominent at a previous major juncture in Peking's foreign relations. In 1965, when the rising level of hostilities in Vietnam was accompanied by pressures within the international communist movement to close ranks behind the embattled brethren, Peking chose to foreclose any accommodation with the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership and to signal its rejection of any effort at mediation. The formulation now being resurrected appeared in a major statement of that policy, the 11 November 1965 PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG editorial article denouncing Moscow's offer of "united action," which pointed out that "drastic" realignments of forces were then taking place.

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As defined in the November 1965 article, the situation at that time bore some resemblances to the present one. Thus, conceding that there was bound to be "a certain unevenness in the degree of people's understanding" of the line advanced by Peking, the article quoted Lenin as taking note of the problems encountered in understanding new developments at a time "when astonishingly abrupt changes" took place. There has been a comparable "unevenness" in understanding of Peking's present line: The Chinese have succeeded in gaining understanding of their tactics from their North Korean and Cambodian allies, but they clearly face a tougher problem in convincing Hanoi.

Peking's current approach differs in a fundamental respect from its approach in 1965. The emphasis then was on adherence to principle and rejection of flexibility, as reflected in the 11 November 1965 editorial article's insistence that faced with "a complex situation," Marxist-Leninists "must never abandon or slur over principles." In the present situation--also described as complex and thus requiring explanation--the Chinese have stressed the importance of flexibility and the need for tactical adjustments in order to exploit new opportunities. For this purpose they have been invoking the highest sanction, canonical works by Mao, to justify current policy changes in theoretical and ideological terms.

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ROMANIA

PRC DELEGATION VISIT SERVES TO DEMONSTRATE ROMANIAN POLICY

Against the background of Moscow's intensified anti-Chinese polemics, the Romanians used the 22-31 August visit of a high-ranking Chinese military delegation to underscore their cordial relations with Peking and their resolve to expand bilateral contacts--including military. Romanian media gave extensive though carefully measured treatment to the Chinese delegation, headed by Li Te-sheng, alternate Politburo member and head of the PLA's general political section. At the same time, an effort to mute anti-Soviet overtones of the visit was evident in assurances of Romania's continuing readiness to develop cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Placing the visit in the context of the Romanian policy of developing cordial relations with "all" the socialist countries, Bucharest sought to demonstrate the policy in action during the period of the Chinese delegation's stay. Thus on the 24th Ceausescu received Soviet Deputy Premier Lesechko, vacationing in Romania, for what Bucharest radio described as "warm and comradely" talks.

Further testimony to Romania's willingness to cooperate with the USSR was conveyed in publicity for a 26-27 August meeting in Bucharest of representatives of Soviet bloc foreign ministries, apparently designed to coordinate tactics on the question of the UN China seat and other issues on the fall agenda of the General Assembly. Bucharest radio said opinions were exchanged among representatives of the USSR (including the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba in "an atmosphere of comradely cooperation full of mutual understanding." The radio said the representatives met with Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu during their brief stay in Bucharest.

ACTIVITIES OF PRC DELEGATION After an extensive tour of the provinces and Romanian military installations and units, the Chinese delegation met with the Romanian leadership on the 30th at Central Committee headquarters. According to Bucharest radio, in addition to Ceausescu, Maurer, and Central Committee Secretary Niculescu-Mizil, Defense Minister Ionita and other high-ranking military officials took part in discussions that passed in "a warm and comradely

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atmosphere." Like all Bucharest's reports on the visit, the account was vague on the subject matter of the talks, merely noting that they concerned "the relations of fraternal friendship" between the two parties, governments, and armies. It did say that there was stress on "the joint determination to further develop contacts and exchanges of delegations and Romanian-Chinese many-sided cooperation, in keeping with the interests of the two peoples and the general cause of socialism and peace throughout the world"--possible propaganda groundwork for a subsequent higher-level Chinese visit to Bucharest.

IONITA, LI SPEECHES In what appears to have been carefully synchronized publicity, Peking's NCNA and the Bucharest AGERPRES carried identical summaries of speeches by Ionita and Li Te-sheng at a reception for the Chinese delegation on the 25th. Ionita noted that the recent joint session of Romanian party and government bodies had hailed Ceausescu's visit to Asia and indicated that it opened "new paths" for Chinese-Romanian cooperation. Advancing a pragmatic argument for good relations with the Chinese, he added that a settlement of major world issues "cannot be conceived without the participation of the PRC."

In blatant contravention of Moscow's line that Chinese domestic and foreign policies are detrimental to socialism, the Romanian Defense Minister praised the PRC's "multilateral development" as "a valuable contribution to enhancing the might, prestige, and influence of socialism in the world." But he balanced a tribute to the Chinese military delegation's visit--a contribution, he said, to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Romanian and Chinese armies--with an assurance to Moscow that Romania is also "expanding friendship and cooperation with the Warsaw Pact and all the socialist countries."

In contrast to his more baldly anti-Soviet rhetoric during the Tirana leg of his Balkan tour, Li Te-sheng's speech in reply was relatively restrained in deference to the situation of his Romanian hosts. He followed the general pattern of earlier formulations of Chinese support for Romania in pledging that "the Chinese people and the PLA will side with you, will firmly support you in the fight for the homeland's flourishing, against the threat with force by imperialism, for the maintenance of national independence and state sovereignty."

Soviet media have predictably ignored the Chinese delegation's visit, as have the media of Moscow's hardcore allies.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

BERLIN ACCORD: RETICENCE FROM MOSCOW, ENDORSEMENT BY GDR

Soviet central media are still displaying reluctance to originate comment on the Berlin agreement more than a week after the Big Four ambassadors announced, after their 33d meeting on 23 August, that they had agreed on a draft accord to be submitted to their governments for approval. To date there have been no statements on the accord by the Soviet leadership, nor has the press carried any editorials or articles by such authoritative commentators as Vikentiy Matveyev or Viktor Mayevskiy. However, the central press, the radio, and TASS have publicized favorable comment by Western leaders, including President Nixon and Chancellor Brandt, as well as East European comment calling the accord on "West Berlin" a step forward in relaxing tensions in Europe. Moscow radio and television on the 25th carried an interview on East German foreign and domestic policy by GDR leader Honecker in which he declared: "We welcome the results" of the Big Four talks.

Only two commentaries on the agreement have appeared in the Soviet central press: a brief article by TASS commentator Yuriy Kornilov in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 28th and a review of worldwide reaction by Nikolay Bragin in the International Review section of PRAVDA on the 29th. Soviet media have reported the various briefings given by Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov to GDR leaders on the results of the negotiations and have publicized--usually citing East Berlin's ADN--the GDR Government meetings held to discuss the accord, emphasizing Soviet-East German unity and cooperation.

TASS observer Kornilov's brief article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, five days after the ambassadors' announcement, was couched in broad generalities. It was transmitted in full by TASS but not broadcast by Radio Moscow. Entitled "West Berlin: A Step Toward Relaxation," it described the agreement as "an important contribution to strengthening peace in Europe" and saw particular importance in the fact that both the GDR and FRG had expressed approval of it. Noting that the text of the agreement had yet to be published, Kornilov said it had been welcomed by "prominent statesmen, parliamentarians, representatives of broad international public circles--all those who truly cherish the strengthening of peace in Europe and European security." He

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commented that this was hardly a surprising reaction to the achievement of an accord "on one of the important and complicated problems of postwar international relations."

Bragin noted in the PRAVDA International Review the next day that "the world public is expressing satisfaction" and cited foreign comment on the importance of the accord and on the unity and cooperation displayed by the GDR and the USSR. He drew on the French ECHO for the observation that it is time now to start preparing for a "conference on European security and cooperation." Although Moscow comment in the past had regularly complained about Western efforts to make a Berlin settlement a precondition for the convening of a conference, Bragin did not now suggest that agreement had reduced Western leverage in the alleged campaign to block a European security conference. A Moscow radio commentary in German on the 24th, the day after the ambassadors' announcement, did not mention the Berlin agreement at all in discussing the need for a conference; stating that a certain degree of detente had been achieved which created a favorable climate for such a gathering, it specified only the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn.

Honecker's Moscow radio/TV interview of the 25th, published in the East German party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day, served to underscore the picture of Soviet-GDR harmony and unanimity. Honecker's remarks welcoming the agreement came the day after a GDR Council of Ministers statement--promptly publicized by Moscow--had noted "with satisfaction that the ambassadors of the four powers had succeeded in their negotiations in achieving an understanding on West Berlin." Expressing the GDR's "complete identity of views with the USSR on the questions concerning West Berlin," the statement went on to allude to the coming inter-German talks: "The Council of Ministers underlined its readiness to render, as before, by constructive proposals and negotiations the GDR's contribution toward the coming into force of the agreement . . . [and] expresses its sincere thanks to the USSR for the agreement which has been achieved and which accords completely with the GDR's interests."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reinforced these expressions of satisfaction in declaring editorially on the 27th that the agreement "on West Berlin" made "full allowance for the sovereign rights of the GDR" and the interests of the West Berliners. As the result of constant consultations between the Soviet Union and the GDR, the editorial said, the East German leaders were able to "note their complete unanimity of view on the entire draft immediately after the conclusion" of the negotiations.

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INTER-GERMAN TALKS ADN announced on 23 August that the 16th meeting between GDR State Secretary Kohl and FRG State Secretary Bahr would be held on the 26th, four days earlier than originally scheduled. Reporting on the 26th that the meeting had discussed "traffic questions," ADN mentioned that Bahr and Kohl had "expressed the satisfaction" of their governments at the outcome of the four-power negotiations. It announced that the next Bahr-Kohl meeting would be held on 6 September.

Meanwhile the talks between West Berlin Senat Director Mueller and GDR State Secretary Kohrt were continued on 30 August. ADN reported that the Senat's and GDR's approval of the four-power agreement had been stressed in the course of their meeting to negotiate "questions of common interest." The next Mueller-Kohrt session is also slated for 6 September.

In his Moscow radio/TV interview Honecker referred to both series of inter-German talks, clearly distinguishing them as separate series. Stating that the GDR had made proposals and initiatives to advance the inter-German negotiations, he asserted that the GDR was "certain that things will develop, and develop well" in the talks with Bonn and that there "should indeed be no serious obstacles" regarding the "West Berlin problem." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's editorial of the 27th reiterated the GDR's resolve to conclude the inter-German talks successfully.

GROMYKO IN Moscow and East Berlin media did not report
EAST BERLIN Gromyko's arrival in East Berlin or his
 departure during the period of the intensive
four-power discussions from 16 to 18 August. TASS and ADN simply reported in identical Berlin-dated items on the evening of the 19th that Gromyko had met "recently" in East Berlin "several times with SED First Secretary Erich Honecker for talks . . . on topical problems of consolidating security and detente in Europe." The only commentary from either Moscow or East Berlin to mention Gromyko's trip was an East Berlin broadcast on the 20th which stressed USSR-GDR unity on the "West Berlin" question and stated that the USSR "will not take any foreign policy step which might in any way affect the interests of an allied socialist state without previous consultations."

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Moscow's concern to demonstrate Soviet-East German harmony during the final stages of the talks was evident in an article by L. Kirichenko in the weekly LIFE ABROAD (No. 34, signed to press 18 August) reacting to Chinese charges that the Soviets were selling out the GDR for their own interests. "Ignoring the truth which is known to all," Kirichenko said, "the Maoists are trying to disseminate lies alleging that the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was signed behind the GDR's back and without agreement with it and that a 'deal' with respect to West Berlin is allegedly being nurtured."

EAST EUROPE MEDIA STRESS RECOGNITION OF POSTWAR STATUS QUO

While Moscow remained reticent and withheld authoritative comment, the USSR's allies in East Europe hailed the agreement promptly in a considerable volume of press and radio comment emphasizing that the four-power negotiations succeeded because of the USSR's initiative and "consistent" stand on "West Berlin."

Calling the agreement another move by the West to recognize the postwar status quo, the East European commentaries insist that there is now no reason to further delay ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn or to put off a European security conference. The Bonn opposition parties bear the brunt of the attack on opponents of the treaties and the Berlin agreement; Chancellor Brandt is not taken to task for linking ratification to a Berlin settlement, sustaining the Soviet bloc's general restraint toward the FRG Government and Brandt personally.

Emphasizing recognition of the postwar status quo, the commentaries observe that for the first time the GDR will be "recognized" by the Western powers by virtue of their authorization of negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin in the coming "German phase" of the negotiations. The formula used to describe the inter-German negotiations, introduced in Warsaw media, is that they will be conducted "by the sides directly concerned--that is, by the two German states and by West Berlin's Senat and the GDR." The Big Four agreement is called "proof" that West Berlin has never belonged to the Federal Republic despite its Basic Law and that the Western powers' decision finally to recognize this principle was what made the agreement possible.

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POLAND Substantial Warsaw comment, emphasizing Poland's own political and security interests, has put heaviest stress on the agreement as another move by the West to recognize the postwar realignment of forces and political relations and on the importance now of getting the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn ratified and convening a European security conference.

An article in ZYCIE WARSZAWY by Ryszard Wojna on the 24th said the agreement means that "the existence of the two German states and the area of West Berlin have been sanctioned legally and internationally by all four powers." Wojna added that "although it has economic, social, and cultural ties with the Federal Republic, West Berlin is not a part of the FRG." The agreement, he said, is "based on the principle that sovereign power in West Berlin rests with the three Western powers," which means that "West Berlin has been and will continue to be a separate political entity."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czechoslovak comment has laid particular stress on the Soviet "initiatives" that made the talks possible, and commentaries in RUDE PRAVO and the Bratislava PRACA, on the 24th and 25th, disputed Western press comment crediting President Nixon with having suggested negotiations on Berlin in his West Berlin speech of February 1969.*

Uniquely among the Soviet bloc commentaries, an article in the Czechoslovak youth daily MLADA FRONTA on the 25th listed in detail the "mutual concessions" made by the West and the USSR to find a solution to "the whole West Berlin question" on the basis of the "actual state of affairs" in the postwar period: As the result of a Western concession, Bonn's "political presence" in West Berlin is to be reduced and no FRG "political demonstrations" are to be allowed in West Berlin, which "even according to the former view of the Big Three Western powers was not and is not a part of the FRG territory"; and as the result of a Soviet concession, the treaty "will include a series of principles which will constitute a clear legal basis for access to West Berlin--above all for civilian traffic which, in contrast to the military traffic, has not been regulated by any agreements to this day." No other

* The President's remarks in his speech at the West Berlin Siemens factory on 27 February 1969, calling for an easing of tensions in West Berlin, were all but ignored at the time by Moscow and East Europe media; Warsaw and Budapest media alone took brief note of his remarks. The Soviet Union formally launched a proposal for Big Four talks on "West Berlin" almost five months later in Gromyko's speech to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 10 July 1969.

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available Soviet bloc commentary has been so explicit on the sensitive issue of access for civilian traffic, involving the question of GDR sovereignty over the land routes connecting West Berlin to the Federal Republic.

Reflecting Czechoslovakia's interests in the agreement, the RUDE PRAVO and PRACA commentaries alluded to Prague's relations with Bonn and their now dormant exploratory talks on normalizing relations. PRACA remarked that there is now "hope that the ice will break" and that the vestiges of the Munich "Diktat" can be removed.

In a rare reference to Gromyko's visit to East Berlin during the final stages of the talks, Bratislava radio said on the 24th that "it can be assumed the GDR agrees with the results" of the agreement because of the various "consultations" that have taken place in East Berlin between GDR leaders and Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov.

HUNGARY Budapest comment has been in much the same vein as that of Warsaw and Prague, emphasizing Soviet initiatives and focusing on the need to get the Moscow and Warsaw treaties ratified. The party organ NEPSZABADSAG on the 24th seemed to imply that Chancellor Brandt's demand that there be a satisfactory Berlin settlement before he submits the treaties to the Bundestag has now been met: "Not even the Bonn parliament can any longer refer to the fraudulent pretext of West Berlin" when discussing the ratification of the treaties and the European security conference. The article stopped short, however, of suggesting any linkage in reverse--a demand that the two treaties must now be ratified before the Berlin agreement can be implemented.

NEPSZABADSAG did say that "various obstacles and procrastinations in the state machinery" of the three Western powers may delay implementation of the agreement. And Budapest radio on the 24th noted that once the governments of the Four Powers approve the draft, "direct agreement will still be necessary on details of implementation between the GDR Government and Bonn, or rather the GDR and West Berlin"--an allusion to the touchy issue of the West Berlin Senat's role in the negotiations with East Berlin.

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In an oblique allusion to the now dormant development of relations between Hungary and the FRG, a NEPSZAVA editorial of 25 August remarked that there is "no doubt" the agreement could have a "beneficial effect" on relations between the Federal Republic and the socialist states.

BALKAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES Comment from Moscow's loyal Bulgarian ally was highlighted by an article in the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 26th hailing the "decisive role" played by the Soviet side in the talks and paying tribute to the USSR's "consistent" policy of striving for "an effective system of security and cooperation in Europe" through "numerous constructive initiatives."

Romania's limited comment was conveyed in two articles in the party daily SCINTEIA, on 26 and 28 August, urging the speediest possible convening of a European security conference and expounding on how the agreement demonstrated Romania's foreign policy premise that any problem, no matter how complex, can be solved by "realistic and constructive" discussion.

Yugoslav comment, while welcoming the agreement, observes that it is of a "bloc nature" and expresses hope that an understanding can be reached which will affect the Balkans as well as Central Europe.

Albania, predictably, originates the only denunciatory comment, branding the agreement "a new imperialist-revisionist plot" and charging the Soviet Union with having sold out the GDR.

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CASTRO ON LATIN AMERICA

Fidel Castro used the occasion of a 27 August gathering of Cuban and foreign students in Havana, en route to Chile for an international youth meeting, to carry forward his recent portrayals of a favorably developing revolutionary situation in Latin America. Updating his 19 April and 26 July comments in light of the ouster of the Torres regime in Bolivia, he pictured the coup as directed against the Latin American revolutionary movement as a whole and pronounced it the duty of all revolutionaries to help the Bolivians.

The lift given Castro's revolutionary posture by the Bolivian coup, which emerged as a textbook case of the kind of rightwing counteroffensive Cuban propaganda cites in support of the need for "armed struggle," was also manifest in the Cuban leader's defiant comments on the OAS. Deriding efforts in some OAS quarters to ascribe a more peaceable image to Cuba, he argued that Cuba would hardly be seeking reconciliation with the "filthy" OAS at a time when revolution was on the rise and served notice that there would be no compromise of Cuban revolutionary militancy.

At the same time, Castro was at pains to emphasize that his prescription of armed struggle as the "only alternative" now for Bolivia did not imply any diminution of Cuban support for peaceful revolutionary processes in Chile and Peru. He insisted that Cuba's approach was not "dogmatic," and he reiterated his position on Uruguay enunciated on 26 July, when he had hedged his bets by approving the electoral tactics of the Broad Front as well as the guerrilla tactics of the Tupamaros.

NO ALTERNATIVE NOW TO ARMED STRUGGLE FOR BOLIVIANS

Playing themes that continue to be stressed in Cuban propaganda on the Bolivian coup, Castro saw the "expected" and "inevitable" move by "reactionary fascist" elements--allegedly directed by the United States and supported by the "gorillas" of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina--as "imperialism's" logical counteroffensive against an "anti-imperialist revolutionary movement" that is in full swing in the hemisphere. The coup, he said, was directed at the movement's "weakest link," despite Bolivia's "extraordinary progress during the last few months." In keeping

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with his previously expressed misgivings about the composition of the Torres regime, he implied that the defection of the military had been the decisive element; the Bolivian revolutionaries "knew that the people could depend only on the Colorados regiment under Maj. Ruben Sanchez" and that "no other unit could be counted on."

Declaring that there is now "not one revolutionary in Bolivia who believes there is any other way but the road of revolutionary armed struggle," Castro addressed himself to unnamed critics who had cited the 1967 debacle suffered by Guevara's guerrilla band in Bolivia as proof of the bankruptcy of armed struggle tactics in Latin America.* He forecast that the government "which today is organizing and carrying out the ferocious repression" of the Bolivian people "will not be able to remain in power" in the face of the revolutionary forces.

Two days earlier, PRENSA LATINA had carried an interview in which the French leftist intellectual Regis Debray, author of the Castroite "Revolution Within the Revolution?", contended that "a historical period has ended" in Bolivia and that "the period of the people's war is beginning," with the "new Vietnam" which Guevara foresaw now "becoming a reality." Blaming the lack of a political-military vanguard for "the people's temporary setback" in Bolivia, Debray suggested that the guerrilla forces in the Bolivian Army of National Liberation had set "a fine example" and that revolutionaries "will follow it, according to their potentialities and the needs of the moment."

It was in the context of a portrayal of the Bolivian coup as "a challenge to the revolutionary movement" in the Americas that Castro proclaimed "our duty as revolutionaries" to offer "support and moral and material encouragement to the Bolivians in their struggle for liberation." An editorial in the party organ GRANMA on 24 August had similarly lectured revolutionaries on this "duty" and pledged exemplary Cuban "moral and material" support to the Bolivians. Cuban media have been publicizing

* Outspoken comment to that effect had appeared in Czechoslovak media at the time of Allende's electoral victory in Chile. See FBIS Special Report No. 304 of 15 March 1971, "Cuban and Other Communist Views of Chile: Elements of Competition with the Cuban Model."

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statements by Cuban organizations condemning the coup leaders, proclaiming the necessity now of armed struggle, and assuring Bolivian revolutionaries they can count on Cuban support, solidarity, and moral and material help. The most explicit such pledge appeared in a statement by a spokesman for the Cuban Federation of University Students broadcast by Havana radio on 28 August: "If our physical presence is needed in their fight, we are ready to depart at any designated time."

BUT CUBA DOES NOT REJECT OTHER FORMS OF STRUGGLE

While the Bolivian events have had the effect of regenerating some of the Castroite revolutionary fervor of the 1960's, Castro's current revolutionary proselyting is necessarily tempered by the developments in Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Thus he saw fit in the 27 August speech to vehemently deny that "we are in favor of violence for the sake of violence or of armed struggle for the sake of armed struggle." He denied with equal force that Cuba "adheres to dogmatic positions, rejecting any other form of struggle."

To document Cuban flexibility, Castro asserted that "we were clearly aware of the possibilities of the popular movement" in Chile all along and that "almost from the beginning" Cuba "understood the new type of events which were taking place in Peru" and "viewed what was happening as something positive" and "supported it." He described developments in Peru as a "patriotic" process under the leadership of progressive and nationalist military men who have "the complete support of the armed forces" in following an "independent course."

In the same vein, Castro declared that "in our relations with the Uruguayan popular movement we understand perfectly the tactics and the intelligent combination of forms of struggle which the Uruguayans are using." The popular forces in Uruguay, he said, are conducting "an increasingly determined struggle on two levels, on the level of armed struggle and on the level of mass movements and legal struggle." Silent on the electoral front at first, Castro went on record in his 26 July speech in support of the Broad Front as part of a dual tactical approach in Uruguay that also encompassed the activities of the Tupamaros. But he was still cautious in July about the prospects of the Broad Front, conceding only that "there is no reason to reject the possibility" that the elections will bring "a popular

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government" to power in Uruguay. Now in the 27 August speech he credited the Broad Front with "great possibilities" of defeating the Uruguayan "oligarchy" in the November elections.

ON CUBAN REENTRY INTO OAS: "THERE IS NO WAY"

In keeping with his portrayal of a blossoming revolutionary situation, and in the vein of his 19 April remarks on Cuba's unwavering rejection of reconciliation with the OAS, Castro asked rhetorically what interest Cuba could have in "any sort of rapprochement" with the OAS "when the revolutionary movement in Latin America is at its highest" and declared flatly: "We would not join it."

Commenting on the "incessant bantering about of go. p., hypotheses, and theories on the eventual or possible reentry of Cuba into the OAS," he argued that the nature of the organization had not changed and that the Spanish dictionary "has no more adjectives to describe the OAS." But he found a few: Cuba, he said, will never rejoin "that cesspool, that filth, that cadaver; there is no way whatsoever." And he declared again: "We do not want to be involved any more in this reconciliation chitchat."

As in earlier speeches, he asserted that the OAS as presently constituted must "disappear" and give rise to a new type of institution that "will be able to truly represent the peoples and the interests of the Latin American nations." On 19 April he had elaborated the notion of a "union of Latin American states" that would evolve in the aftermath of successive revolutions in Latin American countries. Now he looked ahead to "some day when there is no longer an imperialist government in the United States"--when there will be "institutions to which even the people of the United States might belong." For the present he underscored a differentiated Cuban approach marked by interest in relations only with "independent governments" capable of "authentic displays of sovereignty" and of "opposing Yankee dictates."

Castro referred contemptuously to advocates of reconciliation with Cuba who "have to 'color us good'" in an attempt to present an image of "a peaceful Cuba which does not express support for the revolutionary movements in Latin America." He declared defiantly that "we are not nor will we be 'gooded,'" that "we have not repented one whit," and that "the path we have followed

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up until today is the path we will follow in the future; we are determined to continue being 'bad' in the eyes of the reactionaries and the imperialists."

ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.: "NO RAPPROCHEMENT"

Castro was equally insistent in disclaiming any Cuban "interest in any rapprochement with the imperialist government of the United States." Sensitive to speculation that the mid-August visit of a U.S. volleyball team to Cuba, en route home from the inter-American games in Colombia, represented "volleyball diplomacy" in the pattern of Peking's ping pong diplomacy, he chided Yugoslavia's BORBA for concluding that "the volleyball matter could be a rapprochement step." The treatment given the U.S. athletes had "nothing to do with" the improvement of relations, he said. It "has nothing to do with politics; it has nothing to do with diplomacy; there is no rapprochement step, and there never will be."

Castro had conveyed his views of ping pong diplomacy in a speech on 14 August welcoming the Cuban athletes back from the Colombian games, when he complained that the "imperialists" were trying to use sports as a political tool and sought to dissociate Cuba from any such practice. He expatiated in that speech, as in prior ones, on the clear distinction that must be drawn between the people and government of the United States. Again in the 27 August speech, he underscored the distinction and declared that Cuba has "nothing to negotiate" with the U.S. Government. He specified that there is "nothing to discuss" regarding former U.S. properties in Cuba, for which the Cubans would never pay "even a symbolic penny" but for which the United States rather "will one day have to pay us." And he said the matter of the blockade was equally non-negotiable: The United States must lift it "unconditionally." Vowing again not to make "the least concession to imperialism," Castro proclaimed that

this stand will prevail as long as there is in the United States a government that assumes the role of international gendarme, that attacks criminally the people of Indochina and others who struggle for their liberation, and that promotes a counterrevolution in every country that struggles for a just and humane life.

The avowal had clear overtones of a rebuke to the Chinese.

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MALAYSIA

DIRECT TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED WITH PRC TRADE DELEGATION

The promotion of better Chinese-Malaysian "understanding and friendship" and agreement on direct trade arrangements resulted from the 22-28 August visit to Malaysia by a delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, according to a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit by the China Council and its host, a Malaysian trade corporation. Despite this thaw in Sino-Malaysian relations, however, Peking's adherence to its current dualistic approach to relations with its noncommunist Asian neighbors was again illustrated by the continuation throughout the period of the trade negotiations of the standard fare of denunciations of "the Razak clique" and calls for communist-led armed revolutionary guerrilla actions by the China-based clandestine radio, Voice of the Malayan Revolution.

JOINT STATEMENT Paying scant attention to the six-day visit, Peking reported--on a level comparable to its treatment of the 8-16 May visit to the PRC of a Malaysian trade delegation--only the delegation's arrival and departure and its "friendly talks" with Malaysian Prime Minister Razak. The meeting with Razak reciprocated Chou En-lai's publicized reception of the Malaysian delegation in May. Peking also reported the text of the joint statement concluding the visit; no statement was issued following the earlier Malaysian visit.

Specifying that the PRC delegation's visit was in return for the May visit to the PRC of an "unofficial" Malaysian trade mission--Peking at the time described it as a "friendly" visit--the joint statement affirmed that the objectives were to strengthen Chinese-Malaysian friendship and to "realize" the "understanding" reached during the May visit for the establishment of direct trade between the PRC and Malaysia. Reflecting success on these points, the statement noted that "as a result" of discussions between the two trade groups specific purchase arrangements had been agreed to and that "both sides undertook to facilitate their two-way trade on the most favorable terms." "With the successful conclusion of the discussions," the joint statement continued, "direct trade between the two states' import and export corporations will be enhanced."

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The joint statement also noted that the Chinese delegation had called on the Minister of Commerce and Industry and in a "courtesy call" on Razak, "the Prime Minister of Malaysia," had "a friendly exchange of views on matters of mutual interest between the two countries." Chou's "good wishes" were conveyed to Razak--a clear Chinese acknowledgment of both Razak's position and the federation of Malaysia--and Razak returned "good wishes" to Chou.

Agreement was limited to trade matters and did not include rapprochement on such political issues as the PRC's support for the communist-led guerrilla forces in Malaysia or Malaysia's "one China, one Taiwan" policy. The joint statement reported the discussions were held "in a frank, friendly, and cordial atmosphere"--the term "frank" being customarily used to denote the presence of substantial areas of disagreement. It nevertheless noted that the visit had resulted in the promotion of better understanding and friendship "between the peoples"--but not the governments--of the two countries and registered the hope of both sides that "there will be more such contacts and exchanges of visits" in the future.

VOICE OF THE MALAYAN REVOLUTION Throughout the period of the Chinese delegation's presence in Malaysia the China-based clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution poured forth its standard fare of vitriolic attacks on the persons and policies of the "Razak clique"--and of the "Lee Kuan Yew clique" in Singapore--exhorting the Malayan people to rise up in arms against the Kuala Lumpur administration, reporting claimed battle victories of the Malayan National Liberation Army, and denouncing the Malaysian leaders for their alleged subservience to the United States.

Although the Voice of the Malayan Revolution has not been heard to mention the Chinese delegation's visit to Malaysia, it has criticized efforts by the Malaysian Government--as well as the U.S. and Burmese Governments--to effect a rapprochement with the PRC. On 18 August the Voice of the Malayan Revolution broadcast an extensive summary, with attribution, of a 5 August Voice of the People of Burma commentary denouncing Burmese leader Ne Win's 6-12 August visit to the PRC as "an act of struggle in an attempt to relieve the general crises" at home and contending that his visit to China "indicates absolutely no change in his class nature, nor does it imply that he has given up his anti-communist and antipopular policies." That commentary, as summarized by the clandestine Malaysian station, concluded that "the only way to end the crisis is to take up arms to overthrow the Ne Win military government and build a country under the dictatorship of popular democracy."

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In its own right the Voice of the Malayan Revolution on 28 August invoked the same theme, characterizing designs by "Razak and his ilk" to normalize relations with China as a ploy to relieve internal pressures against the regime. Asserting that Razak does not really desire "to have friendly relations with the Chinese people," the commentary claimed that his designs constituted "one of their counterrevolutionary tactics designed to extricate themselves from crises." It also tied in President Nixon's planned visit to China as a tactic "to extricate himself from difficulties at home and abroad and to wage a desperate struggle" in view of the fact that "U.S. imperialism has gone to the wall everywhere, and it has reached an impasse." The commentary was pegged to a 6 July Razak speech allegedly advocating a "one China, one Taiwan" policy, a policy which the Voice of the Malayan Revolution claimed "once again exposed his reactionary stand of obstinately remaining hostile to the PRC" and confirmed that "the puppet clique is a faithful lackey of U.S. imperialism."

Neither the Voice of the People of Burma commentary nor that of the Voice of the Malayan Revolution criticized Peking, of course, nor speculated on Peking's motives for the apparent rapprochements with the Burmese and Malaysian Governments.

RECENT PEKING COMMENT Peking media have not in their own right during the past year initiated commentaries critical of the Razak administration and have pointedly refrained--unlike the Voice of the Malayan Revolution--from personal attacks on Malaysian leaders. This policy has been followed in Peking's rebroadcasts of reports and commentaries--primarily battle reports of exploits of the communist-led Malayan National Liberation Army--attributed to the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, which have constituted the bulk of Peking's output on Malaysian events for several months. A recent rare exception to Peking's policy was a 22 July NCNA summary of a Voice of the Malayan Revolution report on recent battle victories of Malayan insurgents against "the Razak group."

Peking's treatment of the Malaysian delegation's visit to the PRC in May was significant in that for the first time in monitored Peking-originated media the term "Malaysia" was used rather than "Malaya." Except for broadcasts citing Voice of the Malayan Revolution commentaries, Peking has continued to employ the term "Malaysia" in its infrequent reports on Malaysian events since May and followed that practice during the visit of the PRC trade delegation.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

FINAL TWO COMMITTEES FORMED, PROVINCIAL REBUILDING COMPLETED

With the formation of new provincial party committees for Heilungkiang and Ningsia, announced by NCNA on 25 August, the nine-month campaign to rebuild the shattered party apparatus in all 29 major administrative divisions came to an end.

HEILUNGKIANG Pan Fu-sheng, long-absent chairman of the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee, with a chiefly civilian background, was excluded from the list of those named to head the new party committee. Wang Chia-tao, veteran commander of the Heilungkiang Military District (MD), was named first secretary. Wang has served as first vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee since its formation.

Pan's apparent political downfall brings the total number of revolutionary committee chairmen who were not retained as new party chiefs in their provinces to seven. The shift from civilian to military leadership within Heilungkiang fits the previously established pattern of placing military leaders in charge of most new provincial party structures; active PLA officers head 20 of the 29 new committees.

Liu Kuang-tao, a political commissar under Wang's command who entered the provincial power structure in 1970, was named second secretary. Liu is also a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee. Two of the three secretaries named--Fu Kuei-ching and Yu Chieh--hold concurrent responsibilities on the revolutionary committee; Chang Lin-chih, a rehabilitated cadre making his first official appearance in Heilungkiang, was a vice-minister of the Ministry of State Farms and Land reclamation prior to the cultural revolution.

The 87 full and 22 alternate members on the committee were selected at a party congress held in Harbin from 16 to 19 August. Wang's routine speech to the congress, much like the keynote remarks given in other frontier areas, linked the fulfillment of local political tasks to the need to prepare against external threats. After pointing out that Heilungkiang, which includes the Chenpao island area, "is an outpost of our national defense," Wang charged that "social-imperialism has time and again carried out activities of armed

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provocation on the border of the province." Calling for improvement of "the building of border defense politically," Wang lashed out at "Japanese militarism" for trying to renew "its dream of a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.'"

NINGSIA Provincial chief Kang Chien-min, who has served as commander of the Ningsia MD and deputy commander of the Lanchow Military Region for several years, was named first secretary. Kao Jui, a PLA officer with previous responsibilities in Kansu, made his first appearance in Ningsia as second secretary of the new committee. Chang Kuei-chin, secretary, holds concurrent responsibilities on the revolutionary committee.

With the apparent aim of calling attention to the position of minority groups within Ningsia, one of five autonomous regions with provincial status, NCNA identified two of the three deputy secretaries--Wang Chin-chiang and Chao Chih-chiang--as members of the Hui nationality--Chinese Muslims--who form a large part of the province's population. Wang has been a vice-chairman since the formation of the revolutionary committee and has also held military responsibilities within the Ningsia MD since early 1968. Chao is an apparent newcomer to the provincial power apparatus, and he has not been previously identified. Shao Ching-wa, the remaining deputy secretary, was chairman of the China Textile Workers Trade Union prior to the cultural revolution.

The committee, consisting of 53 full and 10 alternate members, was selected at a party congress held in Yinchuan from 15 to 18 August. Kang's speech to the congress routinely reviewed current propaganda themes.

EDITORIAL One day after the announcement of new committees
COMMENT for Heilungkiang and Ningsia, NCNA released a
27 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the completion of provincial party building tasks. Reviewing the series of Mao instructions on party consolidation since the cultural revolution entered "the stage of struggle-criticism-transformation" in 1968, the editorial concludes that these instructions "constitute a development of Marxist-Leninist theory of party building." Although the supremacy of the new party units over all organs and groups is reaffirmed, the editorial offers no specific guidelines in regard to the division of labor between the new provincial party committees and the established revolutionary committees.

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General guidelines calling for factory-level party committees to allow members of established revolutionary committees to perform necessary administrative tasks so the party committee members would have sufficient time for policy considerations surfaced in provincial broadcasts for a short time early in 1970. But there has been no further comment on this question since the formation of provincial party committees began.

LOWER Judging by party building claims made in a 29 August
LEVELS Chengtu radio report, progress in rebuilding the vast subprovincial party apparatus may have reached a high level nationwide. The Chengtu broadcast claimed new party committees for Szechwan's two major cities--Chengtu and Chungking--as well as for three special districts and for 112 of the 181 counties within the province. Szechwan was one of the last provinces to form its provincial committee, and there were no signs that it had made significant progress in rebuilding the basic party units which other provinces began reporting in the summer of 1969. Party rebuilding in Szechwan was apparently slowed by the political struggles which forced the provincial radio to carry no local broadcasts and relay Radio Peking starting in November 1969.

Considering Szechwan's history of political difficulties, its considerable progress in rebuilding the lower-level party network is remarkable. It seems likely that in the more politically stable provinces 70 to 80 percent or more of all lower-level units now have new committees. Several provinces have, in fact, claimed new committees for the "overwhelming majority" of basic units and counties. Hunan has claimed new committees for all its counties and municipalities.

ARTICLES ADVOCATE PLANNED ECONOMIC BASE, WARN AGAINST LEFTISM

Stressing that China's economy is still in the socialist stage, recent articles on economic issues have criticized, on the one hand, "leftists" who seek to advance too rapidly to the final stage of communism and, on the other, technocrats who wish to overexpand advanced technology with an insufficient industrial base. Much of the criticism occurs in the context of attacks on "idealist apriorism," the label being applied to Chen Po-ta, who thus becomes ostensibly the chief target. 

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A Radio Peking broadcast on 20 August, a condemnation of Liu's "theory of productive forces," drew on the experience of the United States to demonstrate that technological development does not of necessity produce a communist state. The key to achieving communism must be not only the development of productive forces, but "more important," persistence in the socialist revolution. Liu and the "political swindlers" are said to have held such notions as "the laser beam is the key to victory," and "when we succeed in making it all imperialists will be finished and overthrown." Reaffirming Mao's opposition to any such belief that "weapons decide everything," the commentator said that in order to defeat aggression "we must by no means rely on one or two weapons" but on the revolutionary people. He acknowledged that "we must manufacture new weapons, including nuclear weapons," in order to oppose nuclear threats; but he offered this acknowledgment in the context of Mao's statement that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger."

Such argumentation, taken in conjunction with other recent articles, indicates there may be a current struggle over resource allocations for advanced weapons. Two PEOPLE'S DAILY articles on 12 August, which seemed to equate electronics technology with "atomic technology and jet engine technology," firmly warned that basic industry such as iron and steel must have priority over electronics.

Concomitant with the considerable stress on basic heavy industry, there is a new emphasis on light, consumer goods industry. In the main this secondary emphasis forms part of a more general program of incentives, including more pay for better work. But it also seems to reflect an interest in improving China's export possibilities.

An 18 August NCNA report praising Shanghai for its achievements in producing consumer goods took pains to note that the city is delivering over 50 percent more consumer goods to other areas in China than it did in the record year prior to the cultural revolution. On 24 August, an NCNA article announced that China is at last adopting a unified system of shoe sizes; previously, it was said, each factory had its own system. There is a hint that such standardization is not designed solely for the relief of China's millions of aching feet. Overseas Chinese were among the test group on whom measurements were made. Peking may have an eye on the world shoe market, an impression

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heightened by a Wuhan broadcast of 26 August which in hailing the victory of Mao's "revolutionary diplomatic line" observed that as a result China's trade will require that "daily commodity production keep pace with the excellent situation."

There are no specific indications that urban dwellers are being given wage incentives in order that they can buy more of the consumer goods now being produced, and in fact the article on Shanghai industrial goods shipments noted above is a further indication that the current program of incentives is aimed primarily at the peasants. A 20 August Canton conference called on poorer agricultural units to carry out sideline production in a planned way "so as to increase collective income and increase cash distribution." And in another effort to aid the peasants' lot, a RED FLAG article broadcast on 29 August rejected the idea that high production goals can be set by local cadres without regard to conditions. The author of the article revealed that he had called for a doubling of production in one year for some communes, and in light of his failure had learned that the peasants must not be burdened by "subjective, impracticable demands at variance with actual conditions."

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